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INTRODUCTION
The development of copyright law has been a benighted effort
to translate metaphysics into manageable legal principles.
Confusion in the law is most evident in the tests of infringement.
The violation can be simply defined: infringement is the unauthorized copying of protected artistic content. But case law provides
only blurry and inconsistent explanations of protection and ineffective systems for evaluating illicit copying. The courts have settled
for finding infringement in “substantial similarity,”1 a legal chameleon that assumes a different appearance for each of three determinations made by the current tests and is clearly seen in none of them.
The elusive standard frustrates the effective evaluation of claims by
lawyers, generating unnecessary litigation. It also produces legal
decisions that defeat the purposes of copyright law more often than
should be tolerated.
This Article identifies the flaws of the current tests of the Second
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals—the circuits with the most
experience in copyright law and the most influence on the others. It
describes the kind of artistic creativity that justifies protection and
demonstrates how that protection is violated. Finally, it proposes a
new test that more effectively assesses infringement claims.
I. FLAWS OF THE CURRENT TESTS
A. Terminology
Confusing terminology is a pervasive flaw of the infringement tests. The term “substantial similarity” itself is particularly
problematic. As the standard for three separate requirements of
infringement, “substantial similarity” is a conclusory term that,
for each one, simply means enough similarity.2 Each of those
requirements, however, addresses a different quality measured by
different criteria.
1

See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1992); Shaw
v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
2
See Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633–34 (7th Cir. 2012). The “confusing
nomenclature” in applying substantial similarity and related standards means simply that
“works share enough unique features” to justify a finding of infringement. Id.
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To prove infringement, a plaintiff must show copying.3 If
copying cannot be proven with direct evidence, it may be established circumstantially with proof that the defendant had access to
the copyrighted work, and that the works are substantially similar.4
For this determination, “substantial similarity” signifies that the
works are so much alike that their similarity is more likely than not
the result of copying.5
Not all copying, however, is infringement; to infringe, the
copied content must be protected.6 Courts in the Ninth Circuit
evaluate the protectability of similar content, in part, in its “extrinsic
test.”7 Second Circuit courts use the “more discerning ordinary
observer test” to make the same determination.8 As with the test for
copying, the standard for this requirement is called, “substantial
similarity”; but here, the term signifies that the similarity between
the works at issue meets the “objective” criteria of protection.9
3

Without copying, there is no infringement, even if the accused work is an identical
reproduction. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); Folio
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991); Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
4
See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Three Boys Music
Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 1994).
5
See Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140; Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of
Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1187, 1214 (1990).
6
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361 (requiring copying of “original elements”); see also
Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140 (“protected material”); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910
(9th Cir. 1989) (“protected elements”); Baxter v. MCA, 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“protectable expression”).
7
See, e.g., Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018); Cavalier v.
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2002).
8
See, e.g., Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123–24 (2d
Cir. 1994); Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 141–42; Folio Impressions, Inc., 937 F.2d at 765–66;
Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Second
Circuit has “disavowed” the need to evaluate the analytic protectability of similar content
in a separate test. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir.
1995)). As reflected by the authorities cited in this Article, however, the Second Circuit
routinely dismisses claims based upon an analytically determined lack of protectable
similarity. For a discussion of the “apparent tension” in the Second Circuit’s treatment of
the requirement, see Ward v. Andrews McMeel Publ’g., LLC, 963 F. Supp. 2d 222, 231
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
9
See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004); Brown Bag Software
v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The plaintiff must also show that the works at issue are alike
in “total concept and feel.”10 The standard applied for this
determination is once again called “substantial similarity”; but here,
the standard is applied through an explicitly subjective method: the
presentation of the works at issue to determine whether they evoke
a sufficiently similar emotional response in those who see, read, or
hear them.11
The use of the term “substantial similarity” to identify three different legal standards undermines clarity and consistency in the
infringement analysis.12 However, as discussed in the next Section,
the current tests of infringement would not effectively evaluate
infringement even if the courts applied the appropriate meaning of
substantial similarity at each step of the process.
B. Methodology
1. Identification of Potentially Infringing Content
The current tests of infringement are fundamentally flawed
because they fail to effectively identify the similarities evaluated for
protectability. Under each test, the courts make this identification
through “analytic dissection,” a method that breaks down the works
at issue into structural categories.13 They then compare the corresponding categories of the respective works to derive the similarities
between them.14 Pursuant to the principle that infringement must be

10

Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 133–34
(2d Cir. 2003); see also Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir.
1994); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165
(9th Cir. 1977) (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946)).
11
See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Shaw v. Lindheim,
919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
12
See Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (differing meanings of the
term result in “considerable confusion”).
13
Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Krofft, 562
F.2d at 1164. In a claim involving literary works, for instance, the court dissects the works
into plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events. Berkic
v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841,
849 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing categories of musical works).
14
See, e.g., Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018); Cavalier v.
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2002); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc.,
982 F.2d at 710–11.
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based upon “protectible elements, standing alone,” the courts filter
out—or, to make it doubly dismissive, “filter out and disregard”—
similarities consisting of “unprotectable elements.”15 The excluded
elements consist of scènes à faire, material in the public domain, or
other components individually disqualified from protection.16 The
courts then make the final determination by evaluating the remaining similarities for their collective protectability.17 Carried far
enough, however, analytic dissection leaves nothing to evaluate
because any “protectable element” of a work can be further dissected until nothing remains but its own unprotectable parts. As
stated by the Second Circuit, “[I]f we took [analytic dissection] to
its logical conclusion, we might have to decide that there can be no
originality in a painting because all colors of paint have been used
somewhere in the past.”18
To rescue this analysis from futility, the courts abandon the
process of reduction before they reach the molecular particles of
similar content.19 But case law provides no guidance for choosing
the proper place to stop. Indeed, most courts engaged in this process
appear unaware that they are cutting it short at all.
By considering only elements deemed protectable at an arbitrary
level of dissection, courts fail to reliably identify the similar
content that they evaluate for protectability.

15

Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23.
See Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1118.
17
See, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010); Cavalier,
297 F.3d at 822–23; Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999); Knitwaves,
Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995).
18
Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1003 (internal quotation marks, citation omitted); see also
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119
(finding that when viewed in isolation, no element of a photograph qualifies for protection).
19
See Diamond Direct, LLC v. Star Diamond Grp., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Lest ‘every song [be] merely a collection of basic notes, every painting
a derivative work of color and stroke, and every novel merely an unprotected jumble of
words,’ a court cannot assess the originality of a work solely from the originality of the
individual component parts” (quoting Yurman Design Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d
449, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
16
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2. Copying of Protected Content
The current tests of infringement are flawed in another essential
way. The tests require proof of copying, but they do not require
proof that the copied content is protected: once the plaintiff
establishes any copying at all of the copyrighted work, the
requirement of copying is satisfied. The courts do undertake a
separate inquiry into whether the works are “substantially similar”
in protected content.20 However, as previously noted, this version of
substantial similarity is not the same as the one used to establish
copying21; in this part of the test, the standard can be met by a level
of similarity insufficient to establish copying.22 The result is that the
plaintiff can establish infringement without showing that the
particular content copied by the defendant is protected.
Certainly, proof that the defendant copied anything at all from
the copyrighted work makes it more likely that the similar protected
content was also copied. However, in failing to require a specific
showing that protected content was copied, the courts take what
should be only a factor and elevate it to an irrebuttable presumption.
3. Appropriation of Aesthetic Effect
The tests are also flawed in failing to assure that the copied
content creates a sufficiently similar effect in the accused work as it
does in the copyrighted work. The Second Circuit discussed this
requirement in the seminal case, Arnstein v. Porter.23 In analyzing
the alleged infringement of a musical composition, the Court
explained:
The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as
such, his reputation as a musician but his interest in
20

See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 268; see also Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131,
140 (2d Cir. 1992); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
21
See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975)
(“[S]ubstantial similarity to show that the original work has been copied is not the same as
substantial similarity to prove infringement.”); see also Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140–41
(citing Latman, supra note 5, at 1193).
22
See Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1994);
see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946) (“[I]f copying is otherwise
shown, proof of improper appropriation need not consist of similarities which, standing
alone, would support an inference of copying.”).
23
Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464.
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the potential financial returns from his compositions
which derive from the lay public’s approbation of
his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether
defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.24
Courts in both the Second and Ninth Circuits make this
determination by comparing the “total concept and feel” of the
works, measuring that quality by the aesthetic response of an
ordinary person.25 Because the test is subjective, the courts usually
leave it for juries to apply.26 But in responding to “what is pleasing”
in works of authorship, juries do not distinguish protected content
from unprotected content, nor do they distinguish copied content
from uncopied content.27 Thus, a jury may find that works are
substantially similar where their primary aesthetic effect is
attributable to their common use of public domain material or other
freely available content.28 Conversely, a jury may find that works
lack substantial similarity where the effect of differences between
24

Id. at 472–73.
See, e.g., Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 1999); Shaw v. Lindheim,
909 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
26
The Ninth Circuit has stated that the test is “exclusively the province of the jury.”
Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006). Second
Circuit courts “frequently” leave the issue for resolution by the jury. See Warner Bros. Inc.
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239–40 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Hogan v. DC Comics,
48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (“[A] jury is peculiarly
fitted to determine [the issue].”).
27
The Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the use of analytic dissection, the only
means of making that distinction, to evaluate substantial similarity in aesthetic effect.
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165–66; see also Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (intrinsic test is “virtually
devoid of analysis”). The Second Circuit has stated that analytic dissection is unnecessary
for that purpose. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66
(2d Cir. 2010).
28
See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 207 (9th Cir. 1989)
(reversing the jury decision on the basis that it erred by finding substantial similarity in
applying the intrinsic test); see also Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th
Cir. 1988) (affirming judgment notwithstanding the verdict where jury found
infringement).
25
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the two works muffles the effect of protected similarity in the overall
impression made by the accused work.29 In the first instance, the
jury finds infringement due to the similarity of unprotected content;
in the second, it finds no infringement despite the similarity of
protected content. In both instances, the test fails to fulfill its
purpose—to determine whether the defendant’s use of protected
content in the accused work produces a sufficiently similar aesthetic
effect as it does in the copyrighted work.30
II. THE SUBJECT OF THE INFRINGEMENT TEST
If the similarity between works is an ineffective measure of the
copying of protected content, where should the courts look to
evaluate infringement?
Infringement is copying, and copying is duplication. Similarity
contains duplication but it also contains differences.31 To evaluate
infringement by similarity, therefore, is to divert the analysis from
its true subject, diluting it with elements that were not copied. It
is the duplication in the works at issue that provides a direct,
undiluted look at the only content that can provide a basis for a
finding of infringement.
Imagine that someone steals a can of red paint from a hardware
store. The police identify a suspect but when arrested, he only has
purple paint, a mixture of red and blue, in his possession. The
prosecutor attempts to prove the suspect’s guilt by showing that the
shade of red in the purple paint matches the shade of red in the cans

29
While this anomaly undoubtedly occurs, it does not appear that any published decision
confirms it. The absence of definitive authority is likely attributable to the courts’ policy
of deferring to jury decisions on this issue.
30
The Second Circuit relies upon jury instructions to avoid these false outcomes. See
Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir.
2003) (In the case of graphic designs, the courts “generally have taken care to identify
precisely the particular aesthetic decisions—original to the plaintiff and copied by the
defendant—that might be thought to make the designs similar in the aggregate.”).
However, any expectation that the jury will limit its determination to protectable similarity
is undermined by the precept that the trier of fact be “principally guided” by the works’
total concept and overall feel. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC, 602 F.3d at 66.
31
If there were no differences the works would not be merely similar, they would be
identical, and there would be no need for a “substantial similarity” analysis.
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at the store that were not stolen. He proposes to make that proof with
expert testimony assessing the similarity of the purple mixture to the
red paint that was not stolen. The judge disallows the testimony,
rejecting the method as junk science. Substantial similarity is the
junk science of copyright law. Where the reproduction is less than
whole and verbatim, a work accused of infringement is like the
purple paint of the hypothetical: a blend of elements, some which
might have been taken from the copyrighted work, some which by
definition could not have been. Determining infringement by the
similarity between two such works is like determining the theft of
the red paint by its similarity to the purple mixture.
While our prosecutor could not extract the red paint from the
mixture for comparison, the parties to an infringement case can
extract the duplicate content from an accused work. Why then blur
the infringement inquiry by evaluating it by the similarity between
the works? In the watershed opinion on copyright infringement,
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,32 Judge Learned Hand stated
directly that the infringement inquiry should focus upon duplication.
In criticizing the overuse of expert opinion in the case, he expressed
the hope that testimony in future cases be “confined to the actual
issues; that is, whether the defendant copied [the plaintiff’s work],
so far as the supposed infringement is identical.”33 Consistent with
that framing principle, he analyzed the claim by evaluating what the
defendant “took” from the copyrighted work, i.e., what was
“common” to both works.34 The word “similarity” appears nowhere
in the opinion. Indeed, the term “substantial similarity” is not found
in any opinion written by Judge Hand. But in another notable case,
he described the standard of infringement as “substantial identity.”35
Hand understood that duplication is the stuff of infringement, and
that the proper subject of the infringement test is the identifiable
elements of duplication in the works at issue, not the disputable
elements of similarity between them.

32

45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 121–22.
35
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1936) (emphasis
added).
33
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It is sometimes said that infringement does not require duplication.36 This statement is true in the sense that infringement does not
require duplication of the literal content of a copyrighted work.37 A
work, however, is more than its literal content. As stated by the
Ninth Circuit in Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.:
[I]nfringement is not confined to literal and exact
repetition or reproduction; it includes also the
various modes in which the matter of any work may
be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced,
with more or less colorable alterations to disguise
the piracy.38
The rendering of a work in these “modes” is duplication, a
duplication of something contained in the copyrighted work. The
only difference to verbatim reproduction in this sort of copying is
that the duplicated content exists below the literal surface of that
work.39 A writer might, for instance, copy from Moby Dick in
creating a novel about a Los Angeles bus driver’s obsessive search
for the neon green Ferrari whose reckless left turn cost the bus driver
his job. There is duplication in such works: both tell the story of a
person in charge of a transport, obsessed with finding an unusually
pigmented nemesis. It is that duplication which should be evaluated
for infringement, not the similarity between sea captains and bus
drivers, the ocean and L.A. traffic, or sperm whales and sports cars.

36

See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Duplication or near identity is not necessary to establish
infringement.”).
37
See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (copyright protection “cannot be limited literally to the
text”).
38
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947)
(quoting 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 34); see also King Features Syndicate
v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924).
39
See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134
(2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he defendant may infringe on the plaintiff’s work . . . by parroting
properties that are apparent only when numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the
plaintiff’s work of art . . . are considered in relation to one another.”).
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III. THE ANATOMY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
For what do we examine the body of duplication? Two things:
copying and protection. Copying is a physical act and, while its
determination may involve some legal subtlety, the act itself is well
understood. Protection, however, is an intangible quality, dimly
realized, and described by legal authorities mostly in generalities.
To develop a better method to evaluate the protectability of copied
content, we need a better understanding of protection—its form,
nature, and scope.
A. The Form of Protection
Protectability resides in the structure of a work, that is, the way
its individual elements are put together. This fundamental principle
was expressed no later than 1854 when Justice Erle of the British
House of Lords wrote, “The subject of [copyrighted] property is the
order of words in the author’s composition; not the words themselves, they being analogous to the elements of matter, which are
not appropriated unless combined . . . .”40 Erle likened a copyright
to the property interest in a river, an interest found “not in any of the
atoms of the water, but only in the flow of the stream.”41 Forty years
later in Holmes v. Hurst, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that Erle’s
words “perhaps best defined” the nature of copyright.42 But the
Holmes court defined it better, describing a copyright in a
literary work as the exclusive right to exploit “that arrangement of
words which the author has selected to express his ideas.”43
Historically, the courts have given only intermittent recognition
of the principle that copyright protection is a product of the selection
and arrangement of elements.44 In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
40

Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 815, 867 (1854).
Id. at 869.
42
See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899).
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (“A
character is an aggregation of the particular talents and traits his creator selected for him.
That each one may be an idea does not diminish the expressive aspect of the
combination.”); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Lest we fall prey to defendants’ invitation to dissect the works,
however, we should remember that it is the combination of many different elements which
may command copyright protection because of its particular subjective quality.”)
41

2020]

SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY AND JUNK SCIENCE

747

adopted the principle for a particular kind of work, defining a
“compilation” as a combination of preexisting materials that are
“selected, coordinated, or arranged” in an original way.45 In 1991,
the Supreme Court applied the definition in Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., acknowledging that protection applies to a
compilation of the names, addresses and numbers of a telephone
directory if those individually unprotectable elements are arranged
in an original way.46 Later courts have used that principle in
evaluating protection for works other than compilations, but only in
limited circumstances—specifically, where the individual elements
of the plaintiff’s work were conspicuously unprotectable, as in a
popular musical composition or a simple ceiling lamp or a lifelike
animal sculpture.47 But the principle necessarily applies to all works
because, as we have seen, all can be broken down to unprotectable
elements.48 The form of protection, therefore, is the way the
individual elements of a work are arranged.

(emphasis added) (citing Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, Inc., 533 F.2d 87,
91–92 (2d Cir. 1976)); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 624 (2d Cir.
1962); Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g. Co. v. Keystone Publ’g. Co., 281 F. 83, 87–88 (2d Cir.
1922) (suggesting that originality sufficient for copyright protection could be found in the
“collocation and concatenation” of a directory of trademarks) (quoting Lamb v. Evans
[1893] 1 Ch 218 (Eng.)).
45
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); see also United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 452 (9th
Cir. 1978); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (“An
original compilation of names and addresses is copyrightable even though the individual
names and addresses are in the public domain and not copyrightable.”).
46
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348–51 (1991).
47
Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (musical composition); Lamps
Plus v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2003) (ceiling
lamp); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (jellyfish sculpture); see also
L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (fabric
designs); Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136
(2d Cir. 2003) (carpet designs); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003–04
(2d Cir. 1995); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)
(computer display).
48
See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir.
2010) (“[I]n the end, our inquiry necessarily focuses on whether the alleged infringer has
misappropriated the original way in which the author has selected, coordinated, and
arranged the elements of his or her work.”).
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B. The Nature of Protection
What, then, is the nature of this “originality” that the selection
and arrangement of elements must show? The Supreme Court tells
us that originality has two separate components: independent
creation and sufficient creativity.49
1. Independent Creation
Originality means that the author independently created the
work.50 The Copyright Clause of the Constitution implies this
requirement by empowering Congress to grant authors exclusive
ownership in their creations “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”51 That grant carries with it the potential for
personal enrichment of an author, “[b]ut the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.”52 The copying of an existing work is unnecessary to fulfill
that purpose because the creative activity needed to produce the
work has already occurred. The copyright statute, therefore,
provides for protection only to independently created works, that is,
to content created without copying.
2. Sufficient Creativity
The Supreme Court stated in Feist that originality also means
that a protected work shows sufficient creativity.53 The yoking
together of independent creation and sufficient creativity under the
single term “originality” has dubious justification in precedent.
The nineteenth-century cases cited by the Feist Court to support
this interpretation suggest rather that the early Supreme Court
understood the term to mean independent creation only, regarding
creativity as an additional unconnected, requirement.54 Whether or
49

See infra Sections III.B.i–ii.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–47.
51
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (explaining that the “sole interest” of the
government in granting the private monopoly lay in the “general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors”).
53
Feist, 499 U.S. at 358.
54
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sardony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–59 (1884); see also
John Muller & Co. v. N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, Inc., 802 F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986)
50
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not originality should be understood to comprise both independent
creation and sufficient creativity, it is clear that the latter is required
for protection.
The courts have never directly defined “creativity” as the term
is applied in copyright law. However, the opinions that have
addressed this aspect of originality show that the courts understand
it to encompass two distinct attributes. The first attribute is
inventiveness. This element must be carefully distinguished from
novelty, that is, the quality of being new or entirely different from
anything that has existed before. As stated long ago by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Selden, “[Novelty] is the province of letters-patent,
not of copyright.”55 Notwithstanding occasional high-profile
waffling in the interim,56 the Court affirmed twice in Feist that
novelty is not required for protection.57 Elsewhere in the opinion,
however, the Court stated that, while artistic content need not be
“surprising or innovative” to qualify for protection, it “cannot be so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”58 This
language describes the requirement imposed by the “inventiveness”
attribute of creativity.
The second attribute of creativity is expressive development.59
The courts have addressed this attribute more directly than they have

(“[T]he issue here is creativity, not originality, although appellant’s argument tends to
confuse the two.”); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951)
(“‘Original’ in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its
origin’ to the ‘author.’”).
55
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
56
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[a]ssuming”
that novelty is not required for protection); see also Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 102
(protection does not require a “large measure of novelty”).
57
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46, 358.
58
Id. at 362 (referring to protection for a selection and arrangement of facts). This was
the apparent meaning attached to the term “novelty” by the Second Circuit in Alfred Bell
& Co., 191 F.2d at 102 (“No large measure of novelty is necessary” for copyright
protection.).
59
See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can be
copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”);
see also Hon. Leon R. Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property (Its
Meaning from A Legal and Literary Standpoint, 11 F.R.D. 457, 458 (1952) (originality
requires the “distinctive unfoldment” of ideas).
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inventiveness. They expressly attribute the need for an expressiveness requirement to friction between the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment60: the former empowers the government to
prohibit the general use of artistic creations,61 while the latter
prohibits the government from restricting the communication of
intellectual content.62 To harmonize these two conflicting methods
of achieving cultural growth, the courts in copyright cases developed what has become known as the “idea/expression dichotomy.”
As stated by the Second Circuit, “This principle attempts to reconcile two competing societal interests: rewarding an individual’s
ingenuity and effort while at the same time permitting the nation
to benefit from further improvements or progress resulting from
others’ use of the same subject matter.”63 Under the dichotomy, a
copyright protects “expression”—the way ideas are expressed—but
leaves the ideas themselves free for common use.64
The division of artistic content into “ideas” and “expression” is
another instance of loose terminology. Rightly understood,
“expression” is the rendering of an artistic conception in externally
perceptible form.65 Under that definition, the thing that copyright
law dismisses as a “mere idea” is in fact expression, i.e., a physical
representation of an artistic conception; what it elevates as
“expression” is simply an idea developed in sufficient detail. The
distinction is not between idea and expression: it is between
sufficient and insufficient development of an artistic premise.
The creativity requirement demands satisfaction of both
attributes. Inventiveness alone does not satisfy it. To illustrate, some
60

See Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
61
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207–08 (1954).
62
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 (1945).
63
Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349–50 (1991); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (idea/expression dichotomy “strike[s]
a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting
free communication of facts [and ideas] while still protecting an author’s expression”).
64
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir.
2010); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (protection does not extend to ideas embodied in work).
65
Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (defining a “writing,” the
constitutionally prescribed subject matter of copyright, as “any physical rendering of the
fruits of the author’s creativity”).
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scholars credit Jules Verne’s novel, From the Earth to the Moon, as
the first literary work about human beings leaving the earth in a
spaceship.66 The idea/expression dichotomy denies Verne an exclusive right to create works about vehicular space travel, even if he
independently created a work expressing that premise, indeed, even
if he was the first to independently create one.67 The reason is that
artistic progress would be impaired by limiting the expression of that
broad premise to the imagination of a single person.68 The idea/
expression dichotomy, however, allows for a monopoly in the
exploitation of the novel as a whole because cultural growth is
enhanced, not hindered, by the award of exclusive rights in the
detailed development that Verne gave to that concept in the pages
of his book.69
Likewise, sufficient expressiveness alone does not satisfy the
creativity requirement. A screenwriter might, for instance, create a
prison script featuring a wrongly convicted inmate, a feud between
prisoners, abuse by sadistic guards, a riot in the dining hall, an
escape through a concrete cell wall, and a chase through the woods
by police with shotguns and bloodhounds. That selection and
arrangement of elements may be sufficiently expressive, but the
work is nonetheless unworthy of protection because it lacks
sufficient inventiveness.
C. The Scope of Protection
If a work is protected, to what does the protection extend? The
Copyright Act states that “protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship . . . .”70 The Act does not define the term “original
66
In that book published in 1865, characters propose to travel to the moon in a bulletshaped projectile fired from a cannon.
67
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (Though
plaintiff “discovered the vein” of a creative theme that made her work popular, it was too
general to warrant protection.).
68
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50 (noting that the general right to use “ideas” embodied
in copyrighted works promotes the advancement of art).
69
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); see
also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
70
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
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work of authorship,” but the definitions provided by the Act for
particular kinds of “works of authorship” suggest that it means the
entire creation, as fixed by the author in tangible form.71 A copyright, therefore, protects the covered work against full, verbatim
copying. The protection, however, is broader than that: it extends
also to parts of the work that independently satisfy the requirements
of inventiveness and creativity.72 There are two types of potentially
protected parts: verbatim segments,73 and non-verbatim renderings
of the entire work74 or of any verbatim segment.75
Works of authorship may be divided into verbatim segments,
such as the movements of a symphony, the stanzas of a poem, the
chapters of a book, or the sections of a painting.76 They may also be
divided into discrete parts consisting of verbatim elements
interwoven throughout the work, such as characters whose attributes
are disclosed piecemeal in the course of a novel.77 Considered in
isolation, each kind of these verbatim parts is itself a work or, to put
a finer point on it, a work-within-a-work.
Works of authorship also include an unlimited number of
alternate versions that express the same artistic principle, but with
71

For instance, the definition of “literary works” refers to “books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards,” but not to their parts. Id. § 101.
72
Feist, 499 U.S. at 351 (independent originality “determine[s] which component parts
of a work [a]re copyrightable and which were not”) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1909) (repealed
1976)); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 111 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(“[P]rotectibility as to a component part depends . . . strictly upon the status of the
questioned part within the protected whole, and the characteristics and quality of that part,
considered by itself.”).
73
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (affirming that
a work is protected against verbatim copying of a “substantial” part).
74
Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming that a
work is protected against copying of its “fundamental essence or structure”) (quoting 3
MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1991)).
75
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947)
(affirming that copyright in motion picture may be infringed by non-verbatim copying of
scene); see also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55–56 (2d Cir.
1936) (finding infringement in non-verbatim copying of individual scenes of play);
Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 F. 864, 865 (2d Cir. 1914) (finding infringement in nonverbatim copying of single scene of musical comedy).
76
See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (referring to the potential protectability of the scenes of a
play or parts of dialogue).
77
See Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241–42 (2d Cir. 1983) (character
revealed “episodically”).
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less detailed development than their verbatim content. Although
these non-verbatim renderings do not replicate the literal expression
of the work, they are nonetheless contained by it. In Nichols v.
Universal Pictures, Judge Learned Hand described these forms and
the limit of their protectability. In a passage that has come to be
known as the “abstractions test,” Hand wrote:
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement
of what the [work] is about, and at times might consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of
his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended.78
In this passage, Hand was addressing only the expressiveness
needed to satisfy the creativity standard.79 As more and more detail
is left out, however, an “abstraction” may also lose the inventiveness
required for protection.80 As with any other artistic content, the
abstraction must satisfy both requirements of inventiveness and
creativity.81 To qualify for protection, however, an abstraction must
satisfy a requirement not imposed upon verbatim parts: it must
convey the same artistic idea as the protected work, or the protected
part of the work, from which it derives.82
This requirement, too, was recognized no later than the
nineteenth century when a British court defined a “copy” as a work
so like the original that it gives “to every person seeing it the idea
created by the original.”83 In the language following his abstractions
test, Judge Hand addresses this requirement by stating that the
copying of an abstraction is not analogous to simply “lifting a
78

See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
See id.
80
Silver Ring Splint Co. v. Digisplint, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (W.D. Va. 2008).
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
White-Smith Music Publ’g v. Apollo, 28 S. Ct. 319, 323 (1908) (quoting West v.
Francis, in 5 BARN. & ALD. 1, 742–43 (1822) (Bailey, J., concurring)).
79
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portion out of the copyrighted work.”84 The copyright in a work
provides protection only for an abstraction that forms a “skeleton”
of the work, a structure that “pervades and supports the whole.”85
The concern here, wrote Hand, is not with how elements are
expressed, but with what they express—specifically, whether the
copied elements render the same artistic premise as the protected
work.86 Indeed, a combination of elements that expresses a different
premise is not an “abstraction” of the protected work at all.
Let us consider this principle in the context of musical works.
The melodic structure of a complex musical composition may serve
as its skeleton, an abstracted part that pervades and supports it.
However, individual notes can be taken from a copyrighted
composition to form a melody that sounds entirely different from
the composition. That different melody might by itself be
sufficiently developed to warrant protection, but in that combination, its notes are not protected by the copyright in the composition;
others are free to copy those notes from the protected composition
just as they might take them from the public domain. To warrant
protection, the combination of copied notes must form an
independently protectable work that conveys the same tune or other
musical premise; in other words, it must form a musical work that
sounds like the copyrighted composition.
For a visual illustration, we turn to the Mona Lisa:

84

Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
Id.
86
See id.; see also Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir.
1983) (“[J]ust as similarity cannot be rejected by isolating as an idea each characteristic
the characters have in common, it cannot be found when the total perception of all the ideas
as expressed in each character is fundamentally different.”).
85
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The image on the left is a fully rendered segment of the Mona
Lisa, sufficiently expressive to qualify for protection. The one on
the right duplicates numerous elements found in the fully rendered
segment; it omits many others but still expresses the visual form of
the segment with enough detailed development to qualify for
protection. If the Mona Lisa were protected by copyright, the image
on the right is clearly developed with enough expressive detail to be
an infringing abstraction. Now imagine that a verbatim copy of the
Mona Lisa is chopped into confetti and the pieces are mixed in a
hopper and randomly glued together. The new work would consist
of copies of each and every element of the Mona Lisa, but in that
arrangement the copyright does not protect them. The reason is
that the rendering does not express the “idea,” or visual premise, of
that work.
Similarly, one might copy less than all of the elements of the
Mona Lisa in exactly the same position as they appear in that work
to create the following work:

This new work consists entirely of elements copied from the Mona
Lisa, arranged in exactly the same way. Further, it can be argued
that this image is sufficiently developed to qualify for protection.
Again, however, in this particular selection and arrangement, the
copied elements do not express the visual premise, or “idea,” of the
Mona Lisa—that is, they do not form an image that looks like it.
Therefore, the copying does not infringe the copyright in that work.
In short, the copyright in a work of authorship protects the
verbatim content of the entire work. It also protects any verbatim or
non-verbatim rendering of the entire work or of a part, where the
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rendering is independently conceived and both sufficiently
inventive and sufficiently expressive of the same artistic premise.
IV. A RECONSTRUCTED TEST
Consistent with the foregoing principles, I propose a new test for
infringement with the following framework.
A. Establish the Protectability of the Foundational Work
The plaintiff must first establish a foundation for the claim by
showing that the alleged copying involves protected content. In
many cases, the protectability of the copyrighted work as a whole
will provide that foundation. However, where the alleged unlawful
copying touches only a part, then the plaintiff must show that the
part independently meets the requirements of protection.87 To
expedite and focus the analysis, the “foundational work” should be
identified as narrowly as possible.88
B. Identify Relevant Duplication
Next, the plaintiff must identify the elements of relevant
duplication between the foundational work and the work accused of
infringement. The plaintiff makes this identification just as courts
identify similarities under the current tests: by analytic dissection—
that is, a comparison of the corresponding structural categories of
the works at issue.89 Under the proposed test, however, we dissect
the works solely to simplify and organize the process of identifying
duplication. We do not dissect to determine the protectability of
duplication in any “element” or individual structural category: if
there is significant duplication in a particular category, the content
falling within that category would be isolated as a part of the
87

See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992)
(approving the use of analytic dissection to determine the scope of protection because “the
source of the similarity must be identified and a determination made as to whether this
source is covered by plaintiff’s copyright”).
88
We speak here of a substantive basis for the claim, not of the registration requirement
imposed by 17 U.S.C. § 412. Since the copyright in an entire work provides protection for
its independently protectable parts, the registration of that copyright resolves the
procedural issue addressed by the statute.
89
See supra Section I.B.
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work and would by itself serve as the foundational work for an
infringement claim.
Thus, where the plaintiff claims infringement of a musical work,
the court would dissect the works into such categories as melody,
harmony, pitch, rhythm, and lyrics. It then identifies the duplication
between them, and the collective body of duplication is analyzed for
infringement of the entire musical work. Where the content of any
of the musical categories in the copyrighted work—say, its
rhythm—is independently entitled to protection and there is enough
duplication of rhythmic elements to justify the analysis, the rhythm
of each of the two works is dissected into its own structural
categories: tempo, note values, accents, beats per measure, etc.90
The court then identifies the specific elements of duplication within
those categories as part of a separate infringement analysis.
The method we propose is objective. An element is either found
in both works or it is not, even if the duplication lies beneath the
literal surface of the works. In one work, for example, a man
commits an armed robbery of a bank; in the other, a woman blows
a hole in the basement wall of a check-cashing store to gain
access to a safe. Devoid of literal reproduction, the scenes
nonetheless contain objectively derived duplication: the burglary of
a financial establishment.
The proposed method also has a subjective component: how far
to dig beneath the literal surface for material duplication? This
determination is a matter of legal instinct. Generally, the more
abstraction required to reveal duplication, the weaker the claim.
Where the elements of a work’s expressive detail are few, or
their variation slight, protection for the work lies close to the
surface.91 Thus, protection for a limerick, for instance, goes little
beyond its fully rendered form. Conversely, for a work dense with
varied detail, however, the levels of protection run deep. A list of
one-sentence summaries of each of the 361 chapters of War and
Peace forms a selection and arrangement protected by the copyright.
90

See New Old Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (where
range of protectable expression is narrow, protection exists only for “virtually identical”
copying of entire work).

91
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No matter the level of abstraction, the test we propose does not
automatically cast aside the duplication in “unprotectable elements.”
The reason is that, by indiscriminately filtering out and discarding
unprotectable elements from the infringement analysis, a court may
eliminate parts that in some cases are necessary to determine that the
copied content is protected.92 The only duplicate elements excluded
from the analysis are those that, given the nature of the works, do
not foreseeably contribute to the formation of an original selection
and arrangement.
C. Evaluate the Originality of Duplicate Content
1. Creativity
Having identified the relevant elements of duplication, the
courts must next determine whether that body of potentially copied
content is entitled to protection. There are a thousand-and-one
conditions of copyright protection that might need to be addressed
in a particular case, but the fundamental requirements of creativity—that is, the inventiveness and expressiveness of a work—
must be addressed in all cases.
An evaluation of inventiveness occupies a place in the
traditional tests of infringement through the doctrine of scènes à
faire. Under that doctrine, infringement cannot be based upon the
copying of content that is commonplace, facile or unavoidable in
expressing a particular artistic conception.93 The same analysis is
applied in our proposed test to determine whether the duplicate
content meets the requirements of this aspect of creativity.

92

Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979–80 (2d Cir. 1980) (“By
factoring out similarities based on non-copyrightable elements, a court runs the risk of
overlooking wholesale usurpation of a prior author’s expression.”).
93
See, e.g., Frybarger v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987);
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applies to elements that are
“indispensable, or at least standard” in treating premise of work) (quoting Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Swirsky v. Carey,
376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“[f]amiliar stock scenes and themes”); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293
(9th Cir. 1985) (“flow naturally from a basic plot premise”); Reyher v. Children’s
Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976) (features that “necessarily follow
from a common theme” (emphasis added)).
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Next, there must be an evaluation of the sufficiency of
expressive development. To infringe, duplicate content need not
reach the same level of development as the foundational work.94
How much expressiveness is required to warrant protection for the
copied parts of protected works? There is no objective measure
to apply in making that determination; as Judge Hand wrote in
describing the line between idea and expression, “[n]obody has been
able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”95 An applicable
standard, however, does exist. As an attribute of creativity, expressiveness must be weighed by the benchmark set forth in Feist:
To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The
vast majority of works make the grade quite easily,
as they possess some creative spark, “no matter how
crude, humble or obvious” it might be.96
In evaluating the protectability of works of authorship, the courts
do require only minimal creativity. In evaluating the protectability
of copied content to determine infringement, however, courts
generally require a higher level of creativity.97
This heightened standard is understandable where the subject of
the infringement analysis is similarity: since they are evaluating
content that contains only partial duplication, courts instinctively
require a more stringent level of creativity to impose liability. On
the other hand, where the subject of the analysis is duplication—
where, that is, all of the content evaluated for infringement is found
in the copyrighted work—there is no justification for applying a
higher standard. Imagine that the author of a copyrighted work had
instead created a narrower work which the defendant copied whole
94

See supra Section III.C.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Shaw
v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is . . . impossible to articulate a
definitive demarcation that measures when the similarity between works involves copying
of protected expression . . . .”).
96
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1
MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (1990)).
97
Cf. Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting an infringement claim because the similarity in elements of screenplay were held
unprotected); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
a commercial photograph of vodka bottle protected).
95
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and verbatim. If that narrower work meets the requirements of
protection, no one would dispute that it is infringement to make an
unauthorized copy of its content. It is likewise infringement to copy
that same protectable content when it is contained in a broader work.
A standard of protection is no standard at all where it does not
prohibit the unauthorized copying of the parts of a work that
independently meet it.
The undemanding measure of creativity required for protection
does not argue against its application in the infringement
determination: if there is good reason to apply a low standard in the
one case, then there is that same good reason to apply it in the other.
What is that reason? The Supreme Court did not explain in Feist
why the creativity threshold is set so low. The Court did, however,
provide an answer ninety years earlier. In Bleistein v. Donaldson98
the Court found protection for circus posters, an art form held in
limited regard by the Court.99 In justifying the holding, Justice
Holmes explained that even “a very modest grade of art has in
it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”100 That irreducible something, wrote Holmes, is entitled to protection, and it is
not for the courts to pass judgment on its artistic merit:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of [artistic works], outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke . . . . At the other
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge.101

98

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
See id.
100
Id. at 250.
101
Id. at 251. The Feist Court was more than merely aware of this language when it
confirmed that protection requires only minimum creativity. The Court quoted from it to
affirm that there is only “a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 358–59.
99
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The leniency of the creativity threshold seemingly undermines
the balance struck between copyright law and the First Amendment
through the idea-expression dichotomy: if a work shows only
minimal inventiveness and expressive development, why exclude it
from the public domain by granting exclusive rights to the author?
There is no fully satisfying answer. But there is room within the
standard to allow courts to enforce constitutional concerns. As the
Feist court noted, “The standard . . . is low, but it does exist.”102
Some courts may still balk at the prospect of holding a copyist
responsible for taking a part of a copyrighted work that shows only
a minimal level of creativity. To them, we refer to Justice Holmes’s
response to an argument that the plaintiff’s works were too
pedestrian to merit protection: “That [the works] had their worth . . .
is sufficiently shown by the [defendants’] desire to reproduce them
without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.”103
Courts in the Ninth Circuit determine the sufficiency of
expressive development in the extrinsic test which they characterize
as “objective.”104 It is true that there is no objective measure but,
as we have noted, there are objective signs that signal the level of
creativity.105 The volume of elements comprising a work is an
important factor in evaluating the degree of inventiveness and
expressive development of that work. However, a high number of
elements signifies creativity only to the extent such elements vary
in nature. A telephone directory, for example, may contain thousands of separate entries, but if each one is merely the name, place
of residence, or telephone number of phone service subscribers

102

Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (citing L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law:
The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 719, 760 n.144 (1989) (stating that the threshold is “not without effect”).
103
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250–52 (citing Henderson v. Tomkins, 60 F. 758, 765 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1894)).
104
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Rice v. Fox Broad.
Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (“objective measure”); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919
F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (extrinsic test is an “objective analys[i]s” of
expressiveness); Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1043,
1059 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“objective evaluation”).
105
See supra Section IV.B.i.
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arranged in alphabetical order, their selection and arrangement is not
sufficiently developed for protection.106
2. Corresponding Expression
The courts do not acknowledge the requirement that, for
infringement to be found, the copied content must express the same
artistic premise as the protected work. They may not even realize
that any such requirement exists. However, by testing for substantial
similarity in the “total concept and feel” of the works at issue, they
enforce that requirement. The traditional tests determine that aspect
of substantial similarity by the emotional response of the jury.107
The method works: where works express the same premise, they feel
similar; where they express a different premise, they feel different.
Our proposed test applies the same method but to a more focused
subject matter. As discussed above, a comparison of the works in
their entireties permits the outcome to be determined by analytic
noise—that is, the influence of unprotected content in the
copyrighted work or uncopied content in the allegedly infringing
work. The proposed test eliminates that noise by specifically
comparing the effect of the duplicate content to that of the foundational work: duplicate content is protected only where they evoke
the same kind of aesthetic response.
The Ninth Circuit’s intrinsic test requires “substantial
similarity” in the effect of the respective works;108 the Second
Circuit’s ordinary observer test requires their effect to be “the
same.”109 Our test asks whether the duplicate content produces the
“same kind” of effect. Where the duplication expresses the premise
of the foundational work, it evokes a response that might differ in
degree but will be identical in kind.
Earlier in this Article, we showed how the duplication in a
protected part of the Mona Lisa might be presented to allow an
ordinary observer to compare its effect with that of the protected part
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See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363.
See supra Section I.A.
108
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977).
109
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
107
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itself.110 In some cases, the means to allow such a comparison
will be more difficult to devise. The challenge, however, is no
greater than many faced regularly by litigators in presenting a case
for determination.
D. Copying
If it is shown that any duplicate content is entitled to protection,
only one additional element must be proven to establish infringement: the protected duplication must result from copying.111
As with the current tests, the fact of copying can be established
with direct evidence, such as an admission of the copyist or the
testimony of a witness. As also permitted by the current tests,
copying can be proven circumstantially with evidence that the
alleged copyist had access to the copyrighted work and that the
duplication is of a type more likely to result from copying than from
coincidence.112 The question of the defendant’s access—that is, a
reasonable opportunity to copy the foundational work—requires a
straightforward factual determination that juries are routinely
required to make in less nuanced areas of law. The likelihood that
artistic content was copied from another work, however, is a
subjective determination particular to copyright law.
Circumstantial proof of copying overlaps with proof of
sufficient creativity: the more inventive or expressive the duplicated
content, the more likely the duplication resulted from copying.113
The degree required to establish copying in many cases, however, is
more stringent; to prove protectability, creativity need only be
minimal; to prove copying, however, the creativity of duplicate
content must outweigh the evidence supporting independent
creation.114 Duplication showing an exceptionally high degree of
inventiveness or expressiveness stamps the accused work as

110

See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section I.A.
112
See supra Section I.A.
113
See Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim,
919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990)) (“[T]he totality of the similarities . . . goes beyond
the necessities of the . . . theme and belies any claim of literary accident.”).
114
See supra Section I.A.
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“strikingly similar.” As with the current tests, striking similarity can
eliminate the need to show access in proving copying.115
V. THE ROLES OF JUDGE, JURY AND EXPERT
Courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits have not hesitated
to summarily reject infringement claims based upon a judicial
determination that the similarity between works fails to meet the
“objective criteria” of protection.116 As to similarity in total concept
and feel, the courts initially disfavored summary disposition because
that quality is measured by the subjective response of an ordinary
person.117 The Ninth Circuit has been mostly faithful to this judicial
restraint.118 The Second Circuit, however, has loosened the reins and
expressly authorized the summary resolution of claims on the basis
of a judge’s emotional response to works of authorship.119 In either
115

Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 412 F.2d 421, 423–24 (9th Cir. 1987); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d
896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984); Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
116
See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980).
117
See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1165 (9th Cir. 1977); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. Indeed, in Arnstein, Judge Frank suggested
that summary judgment was appropriate only in cases of manifest dissimilarity, giving as
an example a hypothetical claim that Ravel’s Bolero or Shostakovitch’s Fifth Symphony
infringes When Irish Eyes Are Smiling. Id. at 473.
118
It is perhaps more accurate to say that they have been mostly faithful to it in word.
See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004); Shaw, 909 F.2d at 1360 (“It
is not the district court’s role, in ruling on a motion for a summary judgment, to limit the
interpretive judgment of each work to that produced by its own experience.”). They have
not, however, been faithful to it in deed. Ninth Circuit courts summarily dismiss claims in
applying the extrinsic test, finding that the similarities between works are “random.” See,
e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2002); Kouf v. Walt
Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994); Litchfield, 736 F.2d at
1356. Ninth Circuit courts also dismiss claims in applying the extrinsic test , finding that
the differences between the works “outweigh” the similarities. See Benay v. Warner Bros.
Entm’t, 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010); Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency,
788 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068–69 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Although the extrinsic test is meant to
be controlled by objective analysis, those findings are in fact subjective determinations that
the works do not render the same idea—that is, that despite the similarities, they feel
different.
119
See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir.
2010) (“The question of substantial similarity is by no means exclusively reserved for
resolution by a jury, however, and we have repeatedly recognized that, in certain
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circuit, however, it is a flip of the coin whether the issue is more
suited to resolution by a judge or a jury in any particular case. A
judge is more likely to make the decision based upon a comparison
of an emotional response to relevant—that is, protected—content; a
jury, however, provides better representation of that fictitious
ordinary person whose emotions are meant to be the measure of that
response.120
Our proposed test provides greater clarity than do the traditional
tests of the roles played by judge and jury in determining infringement. A determination of sufficient creativity necessarily involves
subjective judgment; under the proposed test, there is no pretense
that the sufficiency of inventiveness or expressive development is
determined by cold objective analysis. Judges may nonetheless
make that determination as a matter of law, and may even summarily
decide the additional determination, traditionally reserved to juries,
that the foundational work and the duplicate content evoke the same
kind of emotional response in ordinary people. The proposed test
allows judges to make those determinations as a matter of law, but
the more precise focus and greater clarity of the standards of the test
provide a better basis than do the current tests to decide whether the
issues should truly be decided by summary resolution.
No matter who decides the ultimate question, the courts should
be more receptive to the assistance of expert testimony, particularly
in evaluating whether duplicate content is sufficiently creative. The
degree of both inventiveness and expressiveness often requires the
judgment of those professionally schooled in the conventions of the
art form and the practices of the industry at issue in particular cases.

circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as a
matter of law, ‘either because the similarity between two works concerns only noncopyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work, or because no reasonable jury, properly
instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar.’”).
120
See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87–0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 25, 1989) (Summary adjudication of substantial similarity is most problematic
“when the Court puts itself in the place of the reasonable audience and evaluates the total
look and feel of a work under the intrinsic test.”).
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CONCLUSION
In deciding a literary infringement claim eight years after
Nichols v. Universal Pictures, two members of a Second Circuit
panel shrugged off Learned Hand’s abstractions test stating,
“[the] use of the device of ‘abstractions’ seems but a new name for
comparing ‘similarity of sequences of incident’. It is naturally
difficult to compare literary works by using the terminology of
metaphysics, and the rule thus provided does not seem to have been
used since its suggestion.”121
The majority in that case was wrong in dismissing the
abstractions test as simply a new name for determining infringement
by similarity: the test in fact described an entirely different method
for determining infringement, one that does not consider similarity
at all.122 However, the majority was right in observing that it is difficult to decide copyright issues framed in metaphysical terms. It is
an inconvenient fact, however, that copyright law is a metaphysical
creature.123 In confronting its inherent uncertainty, the courts have
developed tests based upon the nebulous and misdirected standard
of “substantial similarity.” This Article provides a new test that is
not only more definite, focused, and predictive of outcome, it is truer
to the constitutional premises of copyright law.
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Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938).
As a member of the panel that decided the Shipman case, Judge Hand took pains to
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See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Copyright
and patent law “approach…nearer than any other class of cases…to what may be called
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